That’s important. Let’s get right to it.
This focuses on the security failures of that day. First, one of the things it found was that Capitol Police did have the intelligence. They had seen numerous postings online about potential violence, including, “Bring a gun,” for example, but that the police did not share that widely and did not make the correct assessment about how dangerous all those pieces were.
Also, something I had not seen before, that the Pentagon, from interviews with the committee, the former defense secretary and former chief — chairman of the Chiefs of Staff there said — of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — said the Pentagon actually wanted to lock down D.C. two days before January 6 because they were so concerned, and that idea was rejected.
Now, the National Guard, we know the problems in the communications there. The requests did not go through. And then, when the requests did go through the Pentagon, it was delayed. All of that led to a finding in this report that the National Guard did not arrive at the U.S. Capitol until after the Capitol itself was secured.
There is a main — one of the 20 recommendations in this report that I think is most significant is that the Capitol Police be able to call on the National Guard on their own. Right now, Capitol Police is — are overseen as what some believe is an antiquated board of three people who are appointed by Congress. They are slow to act.
And it’s notable that — something that is not in this report, this report does not recommend any changes to that board’s structure. And I know Capitol Police believe that they can’t do their job better until that structure changes. Something else not in this report is President Trump and any role he played on that day.
That’s because the whole purview of this report was limited to security failures on that day. That was the goal.